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BOOK REVIEW
THE LAW OF SPORTS. By John C. Weistart and Cym H. Lowell. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1979. Pp. 1154. $37.50.

ARTHUR

D. AUSTINt

Once esteemed as mere recreational diversion from the important
matters of life, production of sports is now a profitable industry. And,
just as stink clings to an agitated skunk, lawyers seek to participate in
the affairs of commercial success. The consequences are a flood of litigation and threats of legal action that often push the game scores to the
rear of the sports section. The always succinct Jimmy Piersall complains that "[t]he lawyers have gotten into baseball-and the worldand screwed it up. They've created so much hate and so much constant
demand for going to court."1 On the assumption that the burgeoning
increase in litigation has created a field identifiable as "The Law of
Sports," Weistart and Lowell describe the major problem areas.
The authors suggest that a "specially focused analysis," the reliance on "unique" legal doctrines and the presence of "peculiar" factual
settings 2 identify sports litigation as an exclusive body of law. On this
point the authors are forcing their argument; in fact, these "justifications" apply to any industry. For example, favorite antitrust targets
like motion picture production, real estate marketing and the computer
industry exude nuances exclusive to those particular fields. The same
can be said for the contract "specialties" of insurance and heavy construction.
The raison d'etre for this treatise is the powerful stranglehold that
sports has on the collective psyche of this nation. If Marx were alive,
he would preach that sports, not religion, is the debilitating opiate of
the masses. Unlike other countries, where sports are considered either
a diversion from useful endeavors or, as in communist countries, a
form of politics, Americans have elevated athletic competition to the
level of a cult. The cult exults over competition and idealizes winning,
t Edgar A. Hahn Professor of Jurisprudence, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law. B.S. 1958, University of Virginia; LL.B. 1963, Tulane University.
1. Schulian, Jimmy Piersall, SPORT, August 1979, at 53, 58.
2. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS at xviii-xix (1979).
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whatever the cost and however accomplished. As Neil Isaacs states in
Jock Culture U.S.A., "Sport is a constant, a model, a value system."3
In the comprehensive style of the treatise format, Weistart and
Lowell analyze the legal problems of the sports cult. The sweep of the
discussion is extensive, tracing the evolution of the cult from amateurism to universal commercialization and from informal conflicts resolution to bitter litigation. The style is succinct, the research is thorough,
and the footnotes inform and embellish as well as confirm sources. The
overall effect is an interesting and effectively developed blend of history
and legal explication.
The treatise is organized according to the traditional categories of
contracts, antitrust, labor and torts. There are also chapters on the
public and private regulation of sports activities. Consistent with my
teaching specialties, this Review will focus on contracts and antitrust.
The analysis in the contracts chapter demonstrates that established
doctrines can competently handle whatever sports contract problems
arise. The pragmatism of Corbin, the ageless symmetry of Williston
and the teaching from familiar precedent like Lumley v. Wagner4 suffice to resolve disagreements between owners and players. If there is
anything out of the ordinary about "sports contracts," it is the important role that arbitration plays in shaping the relationship between
management and player. The ins and outs of arbitration are also thoroughly covered in The Law of Sports.
It is in the contracts section that some of the unsavory manifestations of the cult are exposed. Contract dialogue reveals a battle between owners seeking to possess the bodies and souls of athletes and
greedy players resorting to any ploy to get more money. In disgust, a
trial court described the struggle as "a fight characterized by deception,
double dealing, campus jumping, secret alumni subsidation, semi-professionalism and professionalism."5 If there is an ironic twist to this
sordid scenario, it is that selfish players and autocratic owners have met
their match in unscrupulous flesh-peddling agents. The irony extends
to fanatic fans who are now drenched by the socio-political, jock-itch
journalism of vacuous sports commentators.
Antitrust is the catalyst that stripped legal innocence from the
3. N. ISAACS, JOCK CULTURE U.S.A. 17 (1978).
4. 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (1852).
5. Detroit Football Co. v. Robinson, 186 F.' Supp. 933, 934 (E.D. La.), afjd, 283 F.2d 657
(5th Cir. 1960). For a discussion of the "often unsavory qontext" of player-owner contract disputes, see J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 2, § 4.03.
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sports cult. In the longest section of the treatise-300 pages-Weistart
and Lowell describe how the cutting edge of antitrust litigation exposed
the blatant commercialization of professional sports, thereby providing
the justification for evaluating the conduct of professional leagues according to conventional restraint of trade analysis. Another significant
consequence of the antitrust attack is that when the dust from the initial sweep of litigation settled, players had achieved bargaining parity
with management. It is antitrust that set the stage for player mobility,
free agency, astronomical wages, the demise of team loyalty and fan
disenchantment.
Despite a vigorous attack, antitrust enforcement has on occasion
succumbed to some of the myths and aprioriassumptions of the sports
cult. There is, for example, the treatment of player restraints. Strict
antitrust doctrine decrees a completely free market for player services
and condemns collective efforts by owners to inhibit movement as per
se illegal under familiar boycott decisions. The conventional wisdom
of the professional sports establishment is that restraints are needed to
preserve the competitive balance that assures fan interest and financial
support for all teams. Despite the lack of empirical support for the
cult's argument, both players and courts have accepted varying forms
of restrictions on player mobility.
The baseball antitrust exemption is the most perverse manifestation of the lingering influence of the cult. In rejecting Curt Flood's
attack on the reserve clause, Judge Cooper took judicial notice that
baseball is so entangled in the affairs of the nation as to be "everybody's business."6 (Judge Cooper obviously has never experienced the
agony of watching the Cleveland Indians.) In approving Judge
Cooper's decision, the Supreme Court confessed that its special treatment was an "aberration."7 Then, in an idiosyncratic capitulation to
the sports cult, the Court justified its bizarre decision on the ground
that the "aberration has been with us now for half a century, one heretofore deemed fully entitled to the benefit of staredecisis. . . .It rests
on a recognition and an acceptance of baseball's unique characteristics
and needs."'
Once antitrust enforcement settles on an industry, conduct once
taken for granted as a necessary function of the system must be
6. Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aft'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971),

aj#'d, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
7. Flood v.Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
8. Id.

1980]

BOOK REVIEW

examined for potential illegality. The authors' thorough inquiry produces some seemingly innocuous restraints in professional sports-such
as the baseball designated hitter rule, football rule changes to enhance
running and field goal limitations and team roster limits-which can
adversely affect the economic opportunity of players and, therefore, be
deemed restraints of trade. As the authors correctly surmise, these restraints are trivial, constituting titillating cocktail party conversation
pieces, and the "leagues are not likely to encounter significant difficulty" over their use.'
To add to the list of exotic restraints, Weistart and Lowell could
have mentioned the acquisition of Catfish Hunter (or Reggie Jackson,
Rich Gossage, etc.) by the New York Yankees as an illegal asset acquisition under Clayton 7, the attempt by Sandy Koufax and Don Drysdale to "tie" their services together in negotiating with the Los Angeles
Dodgers as a tying arrangement, and the refusal of UPI and an advisory board of coaches to consider NCAA probation teams for national
ratings as a group boycott.
Historically, one of the most effective defenses used by professional leagues against legal attack has been to trivialize their restraints
of trade as incidental maneuvers necessary to preserve the ideal of
competitive balance. The Law ofSports indicates that this ploy has lost
much of its credibility. It is thus somewhat surprising that the authors
fail to emphasize the impending demise of the trivialization tactics on
the university level.
Below the professional level, trivialization of restraints of trade is
perpetrated under the rubric of "amateurism." Athletes are advertised
as students who, in the off hours away from dedication to the books,
happen to participate in organized sports-hence the myth of the "student-athlete," whose participation in sports is an ancillary function of
the educational process. The NCAA is the advertising agency for "student-athletes" and their employers, purportedly acting as the guardian
of amateurism in the intercollegiate sports system. On the Division I
level, where the major sports factories operate, these assertions are
patently ffim-flam.
Under orders to be self-supporting, athletic departments operate as
independent "profit centers." This delegation of autonomy is relied
upon to justify big-time sports programs accountable only to alumni
9. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 2, at 630.

NORTH C4ROLIN4 L,4W REVIEW

[Vol.
V 58

and the vicissitudes of the recruiting market. The separation of university administration from athletic affairs was dramatized in the Chuck
Fairbanks litigation. A lawsuit brought by the New England Patriots
against Coach Fairbanks and the University of Colorado for breach of
contract was settled by a payment of $200,000 by the Flatirons, a private booster group with assets of $1.4 million. The school's minor role
is further revealed in Fairbanks' salary arrangements: Colorado pays
him $45,000, Vickers Petroleum adds $90,000.10
Competition for athletic talent among the major collegiate sport
profit centers is more intense and cut-throat than between auto manufacturers. Blue-chip recruits are hounded by hundreds of schools. The
better the athlete, the greater the likelihood of "under-the-table" inducements and other shady practices. Cutting at the myth of the "student-athlete," a lawsuit filed against California State University at Los
Angeles alleges that the plaintiffs, highly recruited high school stars,
were steered by the coaching staff "into educationally valueless curricula designed solely to maintain their playing eligibility."" Under these
conditions the existence of the "student-athlete" is accepted by only the
naive or disingenuous. The pros are neither-they realistically view
Division I schools as talent feeders and as minor leagues whose primary function is to give future prospects playing experience.
The growing recognition of extreme commercialization at the expense of any educational emphasis places big-time college athletics in
the same position the pros were ten years ago-vulnerable to an inevitable avalanche of lawsuits. Weistart and Lowell evaluate possible
NCAA antitrust liability, conclude that courts would initially employ a
"rule of reason" analysis, and observe that the most dangerous conduct
by the NCAA is imposing cost limitations that affect groups, such as
assistant coaches, not represented in the decisionmaking process.
In this area, the authors fail to press forward their analysis. For
example, in the crypto-professional sports programs conducted by
many Division I schools-usually in football and basketball-restraints
on inter-school player mobility and eligibility restrictions should receive close scrutiny. Another practice that cries out for antitrust analysis is the requirement that purchasers of season tickets make donations
to the athletic programs, a practice that may constitute an illegal tying
arrangement. Group sanctions against players and coaches for infractions of NCAA or league rules can no longer be implemented without
danger of court supervision for procedural fairness. To justify
10. N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1979, at 19-20.
11. 65 A.B.AJ. 540 (1979).
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restraints, schools and conferences will have to prove the existence of a
nexus between the sports "profit center" and the education function, a
burden that many schools may find difficult. Also likely to be tested
are the NCAA procedures and justifications for banning teams from
participating in bowls and appearing on television. An immediate
threat comes from the sponsors of basketball's National Invitational
Tournament, who are considering filing antitrust charges against the
teams selected for its tournament from particiNCAA for prohibiting
2
pating in the NIT.'

The Law of Sports has some minor flaws. There is, for example,
no discussion of the professional football tie-in cases (generally preseason game tickets tied to regular season tickets), 3 which were resolved in a manner inconsistent with the typical per se treatment. By
conveying the impression that they are polar concepts, the explanation
of how the per se and "rule of reason" analyses are applied is somewhat simplistic. These are, however, minor imperfections that fail to
detract from the high quality of an excellent treatise.

12. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, August 27, 1979, at 6.
13. Because each professional football team has a legal monopoly in its franchise area, courts
have correctly held that tie-in of pre-season and season games cannot harm nonexistent competition. Coniglio v. Highwood Services, Inc., 495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022
(1974). This ignores the "virtual" per se rule, which does not require proof of adverse effects on
competition. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).

